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policy.	Both	policies	are	similar	 in	 that	 the	government	has	 taken	a	strong	 initiative	 to	encourage	a	
targeted	group	or	 sector,	yet	different	 in	 that	 the	 former	has	been	conducted	at	 the	cost	of	overall	
economic	growth,	while	the	latter	aimed	at	economic	surge.	































































belong	 to	 the	group,	so	people	often	neglect	 looking	at	who	individuals	 in	 the	group	really	are.	 In	 turn,	
members	of	 the	disadvantaged	group	are	 likely	 to	give	up	studying	and	training	because	 they	can	see	 in	
advance	that	others	will	not	recognize	 their	abilities	as	an	individual.	This,	 in	 turn,	makes	 the	group	less	
competent,	and	statistical	discrimination	is	strengthened.6）	
	 In	order	 to	avoid	 this	 situation,	 they	must	be	given	opportunities,	encouraged	 to	develop	skills	and	














































	 If	economically	supported	people	are	rather	dominant	 in	politics,	as	 in	Malaysia,	how	does	 this	affect	
affirmative	action?	
	 Political	dominance	is	helpful	 to	meet	the	two	conditions	mentioned	above.	Political	power	enables	the	




















arises,	which	states	 that	 the	government	should	 immediately	redistribute	 the	outcome	of	growth	without	
reinvesting	it	because	the	nation	can	hardly	wait	for	the	larger	profit	the	reinvestment	will	bring	in	the	future.	
According	to	Huntington	and	Nelson	(1976),	if	elites	implement	developmental	policy	boldly	without	paying	
much	attention	 to	human	rights	or	 free	elections,	 the	 result	will	be	a	prosperous	economy	with	social	
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rather	conciliatory	 in	 that	 the	state,	having	a	channel	 to	hear	and	respond	 to	 the	people’s	claims,	 takes	
measures	 to	diminish	 the	gap	between	 the	 rich	and	poor	by	promoting	education	across	 the	country,	
improving	rural	infrastructures,	carrying	out	paternalistic	labour	protection	and	redistributing	the	outcome	of	
growth	to	people	in	low	growth	industries	(Campos	and	Loot	1996).	The	sole	aim	of	these	measures	is	 to	
maintain	social	stability;	 thus,	modernization	of	 the	low-growth	sectors	 is	not	fully	attained,	and	citizens’	
claims	are	often	suppressed	if	they	represent	the	possibility	of	disturbances.	
	 Developmental	policy	is	not	always	successful.11）	Targeted	industries	may	be	mistakenly	selected	by	the	







theory12）	 that	Vernon	(1966)	popularised,	 ‘As	 the	product	matures	and	its	production	 technology	become	
routine,	marketing	and	production	costs—largely	materials,	capital	and	unskilled	labour—become	crucial	in	
















in	promising	 sectors,	while	 the	 former	 tries	 to	develop	 the	 skills,	 knowledge	and	credibility	of	 the	
disadvantaged	ethnic	group,	usually	 in	 less	developed	sectors.	Affirmative	action	 is	also	different	 from	
conciliatory	part	of	developmental	policy,	because	 the	 latter	 aims	not	 so	positively	at	promoting	 the	
disadvantaged	group	as	the	former,	only	trying	to	weaken	the	discontent	of	the	disadvantaged.	Thus,	unless	
these	demarcations	are	properly	recognized,	affirmative	action	 is	 likely	 to	resonate	with	 the	conciliatory	
policy	and	become	a	measure	to	protect	the	vested	interest	of	the	disadvantaged.	
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	 Source:	calculated	from	MP9,	p.11,	MP4,	p.53,	MP5,	p.99,	MTR9,	p58.
Figure 2. Inter-Ethnic Income Ratio
Source: calculated from MP9, p.11, MP4, p.53, MP5, p.99, MTR9, p58. 2.29 2.21 2.28
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Table 1. Gross domestic product by industry of origin (%)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Agriculture,	 forestry,	 livestock	 and	
fishing
38 34 33.6 32.5 22.2 20.8 18.7 10.3 8.7 8.2
Mining	and	quarrying 6 5 7.2 5.4 4.6 10.4 9.7 8.2 6.6 6.7
Manufacturing 9 11 12.8 19.3 20.5 19.7 27.0 27.1 33.4 31.4
Construction 3 5 3.8 4.4 4.5 4.8 3.5 4.4 3.3 2.7
Electricity,	gas	and	water 1 2 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.7 1.9 3.5 3.4 4.1
Transport,	storage	and	communications 4 3 3.8 7.2 6.5 6.4 6.9 7.4 8.0 8.8
Wholesale	 and	 retail	 trade,	 hotel	 and	
restaurants
16 16 13.7 15.0 12.6 12.1 11.0 15.2 14.9 14.7
finance,	 insurance,	 real	 estate	 and	
business	services
1 2 2.0 9.9 8.2 9.0 9.7 10.4 11.8 15.1
Government	services n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.9 13.0 12.2 10.7 7.1 7.0 7.6
n.a.:	not	available
Sources:	 Government	of	Malaysia.	First Malaysia Plan	(MP1).	p.37;	MP2.	p.31;	MP4.	p.11;	MP6.	p.20;	MP8.	p.35;	


















	 The	growing	discontent	was	reflected	in	 the	outcome	of	 the	1969	general	election,	 in	which	the	ruling	
coalition,	 including	 the	UMNO,	Malaysian	Chinese	Association	 (MCA)	 and	Malaysian	 Indian	
Congress	(MIC),	was	defeated	with	less	than	two	thirds	of	the	total	seats15）	(Table	2).	Taking	advantage	of	this	







Table 2. Seats in Parliament by leading political parties




87.7 84.4 85.7 85.5 70.6 84.4 76.7 90.4 63.1
UMNO 52 59 51 61 69 70 83 71 89 72 109 79
MCA 19 27 13 19 17 24 17 18 30 28 31 15
MIC 3 3 2 4 3 4 6 6 7 7 9 3
PAS 13 9 12 14 5 5 1 7 7 27 7 23
DAP ― 1 13 9 16 9 24 20 9 10 12 28
PKR ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― 5 1 31
	＊	 The	Parliament	elections	were	held	only	in	Peninsular	Malaysia	in	1959	and	1964.
	#	 	The	elections	 in	Saba	and	Sarawak	were	postponed	 to	1970	because	of	 the	May	13	 incident	 in	 the	peninsula.	The	figure	 in	
parentheses	is	the	total	result	including	Saba	and	Sarawak.
Source:	Washida	(2008:	174-6).
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(2)	New	Economic	Policy	(NEP)	before	Mahathir	administration	
	 Abdul	Razak,	 inaugurated	as	 the	second	Prime	Minister	shortly	after	 the	riot,	began	 to	force	rigorous	
preferential	treatments	for	Malays	instead	of	conceding	to	non-Malays.	He	took	equality	of	living	standard	
more	seriously	than	the	cultural	and	symbolic	equality	Chinese	and	Indians	demanded.
	 For	 this	purpose,	 the	NEP	was	established	 in	1971	with	 the	following	goals:	 (1)	 to	correct	economic	






businesses	and	employment	by	giving	 them	preferential	 licences.	Above	all,	 the	 ICA	stated	 that	a	new	
company	should	not	be	founded	without	30%	of	its	share	being	held	by	Malays	(including	government	trust	
agencies	and	state	enterprises16）),	and	Malays	were	also	targeted	to	own	at	least	30%	of	total	corporate	capital	













foreign	corporations	bought	out	were	 in	 labour-intensive	 sectors	 such	as	production	and	sales	of	 raw	
commodities	like	Sime	Darby	or	in	government-affiliated	sectors	such	as	construction	and	finance	(Jesudason	














knowledge.	 In	1977,	 in	public	education	from	middle	school	onward,	 instruction	 languages	began	 to	be	
integrated	 into	Malay,	 and	 it	was	 fully	accomplished	 in	1980.	However,	 this	did	not	bring	 sufficient	
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	 Source:	Department	of	Statistics	of	Malaysia
Figure 3. Growth Rate of GDP 1971-80
Table 3. Exports of major commodities (%)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Food 6.3＊ 6.4 3.6 4.3 4.3 4.4 1.7 2.0
Rubber 33.4　 21.9 16.4 7.5 3.8 2.2 0.7 1.0
Tin 19.6　 13.1 8.9 4 1.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Crude	oil	and	petroleum	products 6.9　 10.5 24.5 25.6 14.8 4.9 5.8 8.4
Timber	and	timber-based	products 16.3　 11.4 13.5 10.3 8.9 5.4 2.7 2.1
Machinery 1.6＊ 6.2 11.5 18.7 35.7 55.1 62.5 54.0
＊provisional	figures	of	1971
Sources:	Department	of	Statistics	Malaysia.	Yearbook of Statistics Malaysia (YSM) 1971.	p.39,	41;	YSM1978.	
p.49,	51-3;	YSM1982.	p.24,	26-8;	YSM1985.	p.190,	192,	195-6;	YSM1993.	p.156,	165-8;	YSM1998.	
p.167,	176-8;	YSM2003.	p.192,	201-3;	YSM2008.	p.189,	197-8.











Table 4. Enrolment in tertiary education (degree course) by ethnic group in local and overseas institutions
1970 1975 1980 1985
total total overseas total overseas	share	(%) overseas total overseas	share	(%)
Malays 3048 8600 5,194 18804 27.6 6034 29875 20.2
Chinese 3752 5373 11,533 18381 62.7 13406 24647 54.4
Indian 559 846 2,676 3928 68.1 3108 5581 55.7
Total 7677 15008 19510 41454 47.1 22684 60522 37.5
Sources:	MP4.	p.351-2;	MP5.	p.490-1;	MTR3.	p.	203.
Table 5. Occupation and profession by ethnic group (%)
Bumiputera Chinese Indian Bumiputera Chinese Indian
Administrative	&	Managerial Accountants
2005 37.1 55.1 7.1 2005 20.8 73.6 4.4
1995 36.1 54.7 5.1 1995 16.1 75.2 7.9
1985 28.0 63.0 5.0 1985 8.6 83.3 6.0
1975 28.1 58.8 7.3 1975 7.7 73.8 8.2
Engineers Doctors
2005 46.0 47.6 5.4 2005 36.7 29.9 26.6
1995 38.1 55.2 5.2 1995 33.4 32.1 32.0
1985 27.0 65.5 5.3 1985 18.0 40.3 38.2
1975 7.5 76.1 10.5 1975 4.4 48.7 38.7
Lawyers
2005 38.0 37.1 24.1
1995 29.0 43.3 26.6
1985 16.4 53.3 24.5
1975 12.8 50.7 35.2




much	attention	 to	Chinese	and	Indians	without	conceding	leading	positions	 to	 them	(Suzuki	2010:	269).	




















	 Yet	Mahathir’s	developmental	policy	was	deeply	affected	by	 the	 logic	of	affirmative	action.	Though	
authentic	developmental	policy	should	promote	promising	 industries	 regardless	of	 the	ethnicity	of	 their	
owners,	the	companies	that	were	actually	targeted	were	exclusively	those	owned	by	Malays.	There	were	many	
objections	which	stated	that	for	Malays	to	be	competitive,	‘it	would	be	better	off	to	start	in	small,	purposeful	
steps	rather	 than	make	a	quantum	leap’	(Jesudason	1989:	118),	but	Mahathir	rejected.	 these	claims	 	As	a	
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since	the	introduction	of	 the	ICA	in	1975	(Figures	3,	4).	As	long	as	raw	materials	such	as	rubber,	 tin	and	
petroleum	continued	to	have	a	high	price	in	the	international	market,	 the	pursuit	of	Malay-oriented	heavy	














foreign	companies	also	slowed	under	 the	Promotion	of	Investment	Act	 in	1986,	and	the	 linkage	between	
foreign	and	indigenous	firms	was	pursued	without	excluding	non-Malays	 in	particular.	Small-to-medium	
firms,	most	of	which	were	Chinese,	were	removed	from	the	stipulation	of	having	30%	shareholding	by	
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 155Affirmative	Action	and	Development	
Table 6. Ownership of share capital of limited companies by ethnic group (%)
1970＊ 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
Bumiputera 1.9 9.2 12.5 18.5 19.3 20.6 18.9 18.9
(individuals	&	institutions) n.a. 3.6 5.8 11.3 14.2 18.6 17.2 17.2
(trust	Agency) n.a. 5.6 6.7 7.2 5.1 2.0 1.7 1.7
Chinese
37.4 37.5 44.6
48.2 45.5 40.9 38.9 39.0
Indians 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.2
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	 Though	Mahathir	had	begun	 to	pursue	a	more	efficient	economy,	 inefficient	policies	still	 remained.	
Privatization	of	public	enterprises,	in	particular,	had	brought	about	the	nexus	between	UMNO	executives	and	
Malay	or	Chinese	conglomerates	rather	 than	fair	competition.	Its	original	objective	was	to	give	shares	of	














































pattern	had	changed	much	with	globalization,	diversified	demand,	 the	 rapid	growth	of	China	and	 the	
stagnation	of	Japan,	 it	became	difficult	 for	bureaucrats	 to	select	promising	industries	 to	be	supported	by	
government.23）	Selection	through	market	competition	was	becoming	more	effective	than	state	intervention.	
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	 The	government	 is	also	fluctuating.	Though	 it	once	rejected	neo-liberal	policies	by	ousting	Anwar	 to	
maintain	developmental	policy	and	affirmative	action,	it	also	recognizes	that	free	market	is	indispensable	for	
economic	growth.	The	New	Economic	Model	for	Malaysia	(NEM)	issued	in	2010	shows	this	fluctuation,	






Have	 they	been	able	 to	set	an	adequate	scale	of	quota	 for	Malays	without	evoking	Chinese	and	Indian	


































medium	firms	produced	and	 lending	moderate	amounts	of	money	so	 that	successful	 repayments	would	
increase	their	credibility.	It	was	also	important	to	intermediate	Malay-based	and	English-	or	Chinese-based	
knowledge	more	tightly	in	school	curricula	so	that	Malay	employees	could	work	well	in	firms	where	English	
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flexible	 implementation	of	other	 economic	policies.	Yet	with	Malaysia	being	 richer	 than	before,	 the	
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